EMPLOYMENT

LAW-TITLE VII-UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT CLARIFIES STANDARDS FOR STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND
BURDENS OF PROOF IN PRIVATE LITIGATION UNDER THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY-Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109

S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act)' prohibits an
employer from discriminating against individuals on the basis of
race, gender, religion, color, or national origin.2 The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to forbid both
intentional discrimination and the use of facially neutral employment practices that adversely affect a protected class. 3 Imple-

1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
3 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977). In Teamsters, the Court summarized the two theories of discrimination that
can be asserted under a given set of facts in a Title VII action: disparate treatment
and disparate impact. Id. The Court explained that disparate treatment occurs
when an employer "treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. The Court stressed that, in a disparate treatment action, proof of discriminatory motive is necessary but may "be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id. Proof of discriminatory
motive, however, is not required in a disparate impact action, which involves "employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
by business necessity." Id. One commentator has indicated that the disparate impact theory is targeted at facially neutral employment policies which correlate with
gender or race rather than at those practices which are race or gender based. Cox,
The Future of the DisparateImpact Theory after Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 4 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 753, 756 (1988).
Disparate treatment discrimination has been classified as either individual disparate treatment or systemic disparate treatment. 1 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R.
RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.2 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter SULLIVAN,
ZIMMER & RICHARDS]. In an individual disparate treatment action, the plaintiff attacks an employer's single selection decision. Id. The Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), set forth the typical prima facie case:

The complainant... [must show] (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
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mentation of the second component has prompted the Supreme
Court to recognize a private cause of action where statistical evidence is used to prove the disparate impact of those employment
* 4
practices.
With little guidance from the Act's sweeping language, the
Court has struggled to define the evidentiary standards and burdens of proof in disparate impact litigation.5 In recent years, the
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
To rebut the inference of intentional discrimination arising from a prima facie case
of disparate treatment, the defendant must produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its determination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54 (1981). One commentator noted that this "means
only that the employer must present credible evidence of a race and gender neutral
reason for its challenged action; it need not justify this reason or establish the objectively superior qualifications of the person it actually selected for a position."
Cox, supra, at 755-56. If the employer successfully rebuts the prima facie case, the
plaintiff must then prove that the assigned reason is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 804. The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion throughout the
litigation. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. If the plaintiff proves that race or gender was a
substantial factor: in the employment decision among other legitimate reasons for
an employment decision, the employer assumes the burden of demonstrating that
the same decision would have been made in the absence of any consideration of
race or gender. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). See Note,
Once Plaintiff Demonstrates Illegitimate Factor Motivated Employment Decision, Defendant
Must Show that Same Decision Would Have Been Made Absent the Unlawful Factorto Avoid
Liability-Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 860 (1990) (authored by L. Filardi).
4 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a description of
statistical tests used to prove disparate impact, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1331-94 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN].
5 See, e.g.,

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (plaintiff
must prove that employment practice which selects minority applicants at significantly lower rate than nonminority applicants does not serve employer's legitimate
goals); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (plaintiff
assumes burden of proving that specific employment practice causing denial of employment opportunities to minorities is not job related); Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982) (evidence that entire selection process creates racially balanced
work force at "bottom line" does not immunize employer from liability); New York
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (employer must prove manifest relationship between challenged criteria and denied employment opportunity);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (employer must show that discriminatory employment practice is necessary for efficient and safe job performance); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (employer shoulders burden of
proving that selection criteria which chooses individuals for employment in racial
pattern different from pool of applicants is related to legitimate interest in trustworthy and efficient workmanship); Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (employer assumes burden
of demonstrating that employment practice which excludes minorities at disproportionate rate has manifest relationship to job performance).
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Court has retreated from its initial reliance on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (EEOC Guidelines)6 and a broad
interpretation of the disparate impact model.' This trend toward
requiring more rigorous statistical analysis from disparate impact
plaintiffs and limiting the employers' burden of proof is evident
in the case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.8
In Wards Cove, two companies annually hired individuals to
work in their Alaskan canneries during the summer salmon runs. 9
Alaskan natives who resided in nearby villages, and Filipinos who
were hired through a local union, filled most of the unskilled can6 Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5 (1982), "to make certain that the channels of employment are open to persons regardless of their race and that jobs ... are strictly
filled on the basis of qualification." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2516. To achieve this goal,
the EEOC enacted the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. § 1607.1-7.18 (1989), to help employers determine whether their procedures used to hire, promote, demote, and refer employees are prohibited by Title
VII. Id. at § 1607.1-7.2. The EEOC Guidelines describe at least one statistical standard for proving the adverse impact of selection procedures on a given minority
group, id. at § 1607.43(D), as well as elaborate on methods for demonstrating that
such procedures are related to job performance. Id. at § 1607.14. The EEOC
Guidelines also explain that procedures which are shown to be job related or in
conformance with 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6 are not considered discriminatory. Id. at
§ 1607.3(A).
7 See, e.g., Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2789 n.3 (EEOC Guidelines' enforcement standard under which adverse impact can be inferred provides no "more than a rule of
thumb for the courts"). One commentator has stated that the Court's decision in
New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) "may indicate that the
Court is retreating from its endorsement of general population statistics and that it
may increasingly require plaintiffs to demonstrate the effect of challenged practices
on the employer's actual [work force] or applicant pool." Waintroob, The Developing
Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and ProfessionalLevel, 21 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 45, 70 (1979). Another scholar asserted that the Court's decisions in
Beazer and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), a disparate treatment case, indicated a move to reduce the employer's burden in disparate impact cases to resemble the defendant's burden in disparate
treatment cases. Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23
B.C. L. REV. 419 (1982). In discussing the Watson decision, another commentator
noted that the plurality's interpretation of the disparate impact theory "substantially narrow[ed] the scope of the theory and limit[ed] the employer's burden of
proof under it." Cox, supra note 3, at 753.
8 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
9 Id. at 2119. The canneries operated only at that time of the year. Id. Some
workers, most of whom possessed a variety of skills, arrived a few weeks early to
prepare the facilities and equipment for the canning operation. Id.
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nery line positions.10 White workers, hired through out-of-state
recruiting efforts, filled most of the primarily skilled noncannery
positions.
In 1974, a class of nonwhite current and former cannery employees brought a Title VII action against the companies.' 2 The
employees charged that the employers' hiring and promotion
practices with respect to noncannery positions, which included
the use of separate hiring channels, a preference for rehires, nepotism, the absence of objective hiring criteria, and a policy of not
promoting employees from within, caused "racial stratification of
the work force." This, the employees contended, denied them
and other minorities noncannery employment because of their
race.'" The plaintiffs asserted all claims under the Title VII liability theories of disparate impact and disparate treatment.' 4
Following a bench trial, the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Washington entered judgment for the defendants.' 5 The court first denied the plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims. 1 6 The court then rejected their disparate impact
challenge to the companies' use of subjective employment criteria, 17 reasoning that such practices were not amenable to dispa10 Id. Local 37 of the International Longshoremen Workers Union hired and
dispatched the Filipinos. Id.
11 Id. The companies' offices in Oregon and Washington hired individuals for
these positions during the winter months. Id. The salaries for virtually all of the
noncanneryjobs were higher than for the canneryjobs. Id. at 2119-20. Individuals
holding the skilled noncannery positions included engineers, machinists, quality
control personnel, cooks, store-keepers, carpenters, and bookkeepers. Id. at 2119
n.3.
12 Id. at 2120.
13 Id. The plaintiffs' statistics showed "a high percentage of nonwhite workers in
the cannery jobs and a low percentage of such workers in [both skilled and unskilled] noncannery positions." Id. at 2121. The parties disputed the exact degree
of the discrepancy. Id. at 2121 n.5. The plaintiffs also challenged the defendants'
racially segregated dining and housing facilities. Id. at 2120.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. Subjective selection criteria are those which involve discretionary decisions. Cox, supra note 3, at 766. Such decisions may entail assessing performance
under objective criteria, or assessing performance under inherently subjective criteria. Id. at 766-67. Commentators have recognized the difficulty in distinguishing
between subjective and objective employment practices. See Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63,
68-69 (1988) (factor ordinarily measured objectively may be characterized as subjective when supervisor relies on recollection and observation and, in contrast, an
appraisal based in part on subjective factors may later be considered verifiable evidence); Cox, supra note 3, at 766 (stating that "even facially objective criteria are
subjectively created" and that there are degrees of subjectivity and objectivity).
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rate impact review.'" Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the employers' objective employment practices caused disparate impact.' 9 On appeal, a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the
district court's judgment. 20 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
later vacated that decision and determined that subjective hiring
practices may be challenged under the disparate impact model. 2 '
The court also concluded that, once the plaintiff identifies specific employment practices or criteria which caused disparate impact, the employer bears the burden of proving that business
necessity justified use of the challenged practices.2 2 On remand,
the Ninth Circuit panel, applying the en banc ruling, held that the
plaintiff class established a prima facie case of disparate impact
with regard to hiring practices for all noncannery positions.2 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address issues regarding the proper application of the disparate impact theory in a Title VII action. 24 The Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for an assessment of whether the plaintiff could establish a prima facie
disparate impact violation. 2 5 The Court determined that the disparate impact plaintiff must identify one or more specific employment practices 26 that caused a statistically significant disparity
between the "racial composition of the qualified persons in the
labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs."' 27 The defendant, in the Court's view, must then produce evidence showing that the challenged practice served the employer's legitimate
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2120 (1989).
19 Id. These objective practices included an English language requirement, a
rehiring preference, a failure to publicize noncannery openings, and alleged nepotism in hiring. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. (citing Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989)). The Ninth Circuit panel reached this conclusion by
comparing the high percentage of nonwhite persons employed as cannery workers
with the low percentage of nonwhite persons employed as noncannery workers.
Antonio, 827 F.2d at 444-45. In remanding the case for further proceedings, the
panel instructed the district court that the employer bears the burden of proving
that business necessity justified the practices which caused the disparate impact.
Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2120. The district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims remained undisturbed.
24 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121.
25 Id. at 2123-24.
26 Id. at 2124.
27 Id. at 2121.
18
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goals.2s The plaintiff who fails to meet the burden of persuasion
on this issue, the Court continued, must prove that equally effective practices would have produced a more desirable racial
effect.29

In 1971, the United States Supreme Court was given its first
opportunity to interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
in terms of employment discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co."0 In Griggs, the Court outlined the basic structure of litigation
under the disparate impact theory. 3 ' Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court,32 held that any employment practice
which excludes minorities at a disproportionate rate is prohibited
if it is not related to job performance.33 The Court deferred to
the EEOC Guidelines which stated that Title VII permits only the
use ofjob related tests, 4 noting that the legislative history of Title VII supported the Commission's construction.3 5 The Griggs
majority emphasized that the employer assumes the burden of
demonstrating that such a practice was manifestly related to the
job opportunity that was denied to the plaintiff.36 The touchstone, the Court stressed, is business necessity.37 Applying these
principles, the majority found that the corporate employer in
Id. at 2125-26 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2126-27.
401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 59, 61-62
(1972) (citations omitted) ("[Griggs] provided the first occasion for the [Supreme
Court] to determine the nature and scope of the prohibition on racial discrimination in employment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.... The [opinion] redefine[d] discrimination in terms of consequence rather than motive, effect rather
than purpose.").
31 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424. Scholars have asserted that "the order and allocation of proof set forth in Griggs and refined in [subsequent disparate impact cases]
represents ... an analytical tool for evaluating evidence and not a three-step procedure by which evidence is presented." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1325.
32 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425. Justice Brennan did not participate in the decision. Id.
at 436.
33 Id. at 431.
34 Id. at 433-36. The Court referred to the EEOC's interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) which "authorizes the use of 'any professionally developed ability
test' that is not 'designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race
'
Id. at 433 (emphasis in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(1982)).
35 Id. at 434.
36 Id. at 432.
37 Id. at 431. Business necessity and job relatedness are intertwined, judicially
created defenses to a claim of disparate impact. SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS,
supra note 3, at § 4.3.2 ("[t]he difference between the two is that job relatedness is
confined to showing that the performance of the employee on the job is affected,
while business necessity may take into account factors not directly related to employee performance on a particular job").
28
29
30
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Griggs violated Title VII by selecting individuals for certain desirable positions based upon their attainment of a high school education and satisfactory scores on two professionally developed
tests.38 Chief Justice Burger reasoned that these criteria, which
disqualified blacks at a significantly higher rate than whites, 3 9
were not shown to "bear a demonstrable relationship" to the
successful performance of the positions for which they were
used.4 °
The Court did not have occasion to clarify the correct standard of proof for job relatedness until four years later in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody. 4 ' As in Griggs, the plaintiffs in Albemarle chal42
lenged an employer's use of aptitude tests for job placementtests that few blacks were able to pass.43 Applying the exacting
standards set forth in the EEOC Guidelines, the Albemarle Court
38 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-36 (1971). The Duke Power
Company plant was organized into five departments. Id. at 427. The highest payingjobs in the Labor Department paid comparatively less than the lowest compensated positions in the other four departments. Id. The company placed only those
new employees who passed two aptitude tests and possessed a high school diploma
and only those incumbent employees who either passed the tests or possessed a
high school diploma in the more lucrative departments. Id. at 427-28. The plant
used the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension
Test. Id. at 428.
39 Id. at 430 n.6. In one administration of the tests, fifty-eight percent of the
whites passed, while only six percent of the blacks passed. Id. Also, North Carolina
census figures revealed that thirty-four percent of the state's white males had high
school diplomas, while only twelve percent of the state's black males completed
high school. Id. Thus, the test and diploma requirements prevented disproportionate numbers of black persons from acquiring skilled jobs. Id. at 426.
40 Id. at 431. The Court reached this conclusion despite evidence that the criteria were facially neutral, applied fairly, and intended to improve the quality of the
work force. Id. at 429-31. The Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
intended to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
[that] operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. at 431. Consequently, the Court continued, "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430. The Court further stated that "good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability." Id. at 432.
41 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court granted certiorari to address "the showing
required to establish the 'job relatedness' of pre-employment tests." Id. at 413 (citations omitted).
42 Id. at 410-11. The company administered the Revised Beta Examination,
which allegedly measured nonverbal intelligence, and the Wonderlic Personnel
Test, which allegedly measured verbal facility. Id. Scores on these tests determined eligibility for placement in various skilled lines of progression at a plant
which manufactured paper products from raw wood. Id. at 427-29.
43 Id. at 428-29.

838

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:831

held that a validation study conducted by the employer in support of its position did not prove that the aptitude tests were related to the relatively skilled factory positions at issue." In
44 Id. at 429-36. Four months before trial, the defendant hired an industrial psychology expert to determine whether the aptitude tests were job related. Id. at 429.
The expert compared aptitude test scores of current employees with their supervisors'judgments of their relative abilities. Id. at 430. Although the study revealed a
statistically significant correlation between the two figures, the majority found the
study materially defective in several respects when measured against the EEOC
Guidelines to which the Court accorded great deference. Id. at 431. The study
showed statistically significant correlations for too few jobs. Id. It compared test
scores with subjective rankings of supervisors who were not told any specific criteria to consider. Id. at 432-33. The study tested mostly upper level employees
rather than entry level employees. Id. at 433-34. It tested only job-experienced,
white workers. Id. at 435.
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, objected to the Court's rigid application of the
EEOC Guidelines, reasoning that it would force employers to engage in subjective
quota systems of employment selection in conflict with the intent of Title VII. Id. at
449 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Justice stated
that
pre-employment tests, like most attempts to predict the future, will
never be completely accurate. We should bear in mind that pre-employment testing, so long as it is fairly related to the job skills or work
characteristics desired, possesses the potential of being an effective
weapon in protecting equal employment opportunity because it has a
unique capacity to measure all applicants objectively on a standardized basis.
Id.
Justice Burger, also in dissent, contended that the EEOC Guidelines "interpret
no section of Title VII and are nowhere referred to in its legislative history" and are
"entitled to the same weight as other well-founded testimony by experts in the field
of employment testing." Id. at 452 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Three techniques have been approved by the EEOC to prove that a challenged
employment practice is related to job performance: criterion-related validation,
content validation, and construct validation. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (1989). For a
detailed discussion of these methods, see SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note
3, at § 4.5; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 162-90. A criterion-related validation study shows the correlation between performance on an employment test and
performance on thejob. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(2) (1989). A content validation
study reveals the degree to which a selection procedure "is a representative sample
of the content of the job." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(C)(1) (1989). A construct validation strategy demonstrates the extent to which an employment test measures a behavioral characteristic. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(D) (1989). The choice of a validation
strategy can determine the outcome of Title VII litigation. SULLIVAN, ZIMMER &
RICHARDS, supra note 3, at § 4.5.5.
The employer in Albemarle attempted to demonstrate the criterion-related validity of its employment tests. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 429-36; SULLIVAN, ZIMMER &
RICHARDS, supra note 3, at § 4.5.1. Although testing experts prefer this strategy, id.
at § 4.5.5, commentators have noted that few tests can be found valid under the
EEOC's interpretation of criterion-related validation studies. Id. at § 4.5.1 (citing
Booth & Mackay, Legal Constraintson Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law,
29 EMORY L.J. 121, 125 (1980)).
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addition, the majority elaborated on the basic structure of disparate impact litigation originally set forth in Griggs.45 The Court
essentially parallelled the order of proof with that of disparate
treatment cases.46 The Court stated that a complaining party or
class establishes prima facie discrimination by showing that the
racial composition of applicants selected for employment opportunities through the use of screening tests is significantly different from the racial composition of the pool of applicants.47 The
majority further held that the employer then carries the burden
of proving that such tests are related to a legitimate interest in
trustworthy and efficient workmanship. 48 If the employer succeeds in meeting this burden, the Court continued, the complaining party has the opportunity to show that other selection
devices would serve the employer's legitimate goals without causing a similarly unacceptable racial disparity.49 Such a showing,
the Court explained, would be evidence that the defendant used
such tests as a pretext for discrimination.5 °
One year later in Washington v. Davis,5 the Supreme Court
undermined the certainty that the EEOC Guidelines had provided for proving job relatedness. 52 Davis involved a written
Civil Service test that excluded a disproportionately high number
of blacks applying for employment as police officers in the District of Columbia. 53 Writing for the majority, Justice White held
45 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. Commentators have noted that the Albemarle Court
refined the allocation of proof in disparate impact cases. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra
note 4, at 84.
46 See Furnish, supra note 7, at 421-25; Belton, Causationin Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1293 (1988).
47 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. Specifically, the Court stated that the plaintiff establishes prima facie discrimination by showing that the employer's tests "select
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that
of the pool of applicants." Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973)).
48 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
49 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
50 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
51 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
52 Id. This development was emphasized by Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion which noted the majority's failure to rely on the EEOC Guidelines. Id. at 263
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See Kandel, Burden of Proof after Watson: A Major Shift in
Disparate Impact Litigation?, 14 Employee Relations L.J., 263, 266 (1988). Scholars have noted that subsequently promulgated EEOC Guidelines have tended to
follow the less rigorous approach to test validation which was employed by the
Davis Court and Which "generally comports with recent developments in industrial
psychology." SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 3, at § 4.5.1.
53 Davis, 426 U.S. at 232-34. The examination, designed by the Civil Service
Commission, tested vocabulary, verbal ability, reading, and comprehension. Id. at
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that the police department was entitled to summary judgment
under Title VII standards despite the department's failure to
prove a direct relationship between test scores and job performance.54 The Court reasoned that evidence of a positive correlation between test scores and performance in the police training
program was sufficient to validate the test because such training
was an important prerequisite to adequate job performance. 5
Despite the Court's acceptance of statistical comparisons to
prove employment discrimination, its reluctance to enunciate
specific guidelines for such analysis forced the lower courts to
undertake this task.56 Eventually, the Court began to clarify the
role of statistical comparisons in proving the discriminatory impact of selection devices on a protected group.5 7 In doing so, the
Court endorsed methods of statistical analysis different from
those employed in Griggs and Albemarle.58 One such mode of
analysis, comparing the percentage of minorities in the employer's work force with the percentage of minorities in the relevant labor pool, was used in the disparate treatment case of
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. 59 In Teamsters,

the United States instituted an action against a national common
234-35 (citing Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 512
F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
54 Id. at 248-52. Because Title VII did not protect federal employees at that
time, id. at 238 n.10, the plaintiffs alleged discrimination under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-320 which, like Tide VII, contained language prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of religion, race, color, or national origin. Id. at 233 n.2.
While the Court rejected the applicability of the Griggs analysis to constitutional
claims, id. at 238-48, it reviewed the lower court's Griggs analysis with reference to
the D.C. Code. Id. at 248-52.
55 Id. at 250. The Court determined that a validation study showing the relationship between test scores and performance in the training program supported
the district court's conclusion that a direct relationship existed between the two. Id.
at 251 n.17. The majority noted that "some minimum verbal and communicative
skill would be very useful, if not essential, to satisfactory progress in the training
regimen." Id. at 250.
56 See Waintroob, supra note 7, at 69.
57 Id. at 69-89.
58 Id. The Griggs and Albemarle case involved pass/fail comparisons. SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1333. Such statistics compare the percentage of minorities who would satisfy the employer's criteria with the percentage of nonminorities
who would meet the criteria. Id. at 1332. In Griggs, the pass/fail comparisons involved potential applicants, while in Albemarle they pertained to actual applicants.
Id. at 1333. This approach was set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
59 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Teamsters involved a population/work force comparison.
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1334. In such a case, either the general population, or a portion of it, is compared with the employer's work force. Id. For a
thorough discussion on statistical proof of discrimination, see id. at 1331-94.
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carrier of motor freight, and an associated union, alleging that
the defendants had intentionally discriminated against minorities
in hiring persons to work as line drivers.' The Supreme Court
held that the evidence introduced at trial, consisting of statistical
proof bolstered by testimony of discriminatory practices, was sufficient to establish a prima facie Title VII violation. 6 ' The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stewart, emphasized the
important role statistics play in proving discrimination.62 In this
case, Justice Stewart recognized that the statistics showed that,
while minorities accounted for nine percent of the employer's
work force, they accounted for only seven tenths of a percent of
the line driver positions. 63 Furthermore, the Court noted a rela60 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328-29. Specifically, the United States claimed that the
defendants "had engaged in a pattern or practice of" discriminatory hiring in violation of § 707(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a). Id. at 32829 n. 1. At the time of suit, that provision authorized the Attorney General to institute a civil action to redress "pattern or practice" violations. Id. The government
argued that the defendants "regularly and purposefully treated negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans less favorably than white persons." Id. at 335. Commentators have labelled this form of discrimination systemic disparate treatment. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion on systemic disparate treatment.
Systemic disparate treatment occurs when an employer intentionally uses a
proscribed criterion in making a variety of employment decisions. SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 3, at § 2.3. The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
either by providing evidence of formal discriminatory policies, or "by showing a
pattern of decision making that reveals a racial bias." Id. The later can be accomplished by presenting statistical evidence which shows "a gross and longlasting disparity between the racial composition of the employer's work force (the 'observed')
and what the composition should be .had the employer not discriminated (the 'expected')." Id. To determine the expected composition, the plaintiff frequently
looks at "the racial composition of the labor market from which the defendant
could be expected to pick its workers." Id. Such evidence can be buttressed by
witness testimony supporting the inference of discriminatory policies. Id. The defendant's most promising defense is to show that the prima facie case is flawed due
to an inaccurately defined labor market. Id. The employer may introduce "evidence of the effect of race and gender neutral considerations (such as qualifications
not considered in the prima facie case and the effect of self-selection by applicants)
on the disparity disclosed by plaintiff's proof." Cox, supra note 3, at 760. Professor
Cox explained that the employer, "in effect, 'articulates legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons' for the disparity." Id. (citations omitted). In Teamsters, Spanish-surnamed and black persons who were hired, according to the government, were
assigned to less desirable, lower paying positions as local city drivers or servicemen. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329. Line drivers, or over-the-road drivers, haul freight
over long distances between company terminals. Id. at 329 n.3.
61 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337-38. The Court stated that the testimony of witnesses "brought the cold numbers convincingly to life." Id. at 339.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 337. While 5% of the company's total employees were black and 4%
were Spanish-surnamed Americans, only 0.4% of the company's line drivers were
black and 0.3% were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Id.

842

SETON HALL LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:831

tively high percentage of the minorities as compared with nonminorities in the employer's work force held lower paying, less
desirable jobs. 64 The Court acknowledged the probative force,
in an intentional discrimination suit, of statistics showing an ethnic or racial imbalance. 6 5 The majority reasoned that ordinarily
the ethnic and racial composition of the defendant's work force
would reflect that of the segment of the population from which
employees are selected.6 6 The Court further indicated that general population figures might not accurately reflect the group of
qualified job applicants.6 7
The Court continued to clarify the role of statistics in employment discrimination litigation in Hazelwood School District v.
United States, 68 another 1977 decision involving an allegation of
intentional discrimination.6 9 In Hazelwood, the United States Attorney General brought an action against the Hazelwood School
District and some of its officials alleging that they engaged in
"pattern or practice" discrimination against blacks in hiring
teachers in violation of Title VII. 70 Justice Stewart, again writing
for the Court, asserted that the plaintiff's proof of prima facie
discrimination would ideally reveal a statistically significant disparity between the percentage of minorities in the employer's
work force relative to the appropriate labor pool. 7 ' The Court
stressed that carefully defining the relevant labor market is crucial, because this determination affects the validity of any tests of
statistical significance. 72 The majority determined that this in64 Id. at 337-38. Eighty-three percent of the blacks working for the company and
78% of the Spanish-surnamed Americans working for the company held lower paying serviceman and city operations jobs, while only 39% of nonminority persons
held such jobs. Id.
65 Id. at 339.
66 Id. at 339-40 n.20. The Court admitted, however, that "Title VII imposes no
requirement that a work force mirror the general population." Id.
67 Id.
68 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
69 Id. at 301.
70 Id. This action was instituted before the 1972 amendments to Title VII which
permitted the EEOC to bring such enforcement actions against private employers.
Id. at 301 n.1.
71 Id. at 308. Thus, the Attorney General should have compared the percentage
of black teachers in the Hazelwood School District with the percentage of black
teachers in the relevant labor pool, rather than with the percentage of black students in the Hazelwood school system. Id. The statistics showed that the percentage of black teachers in the Hazelwood School District was 1.4% in the 1972-73
school year and 1.8% in the 1973-74 school year. Id. In contrast, the percentage of
qualified black teachers in the area, according to the 1970 census, was at least
5.7%. Id.
72 Id. at 311-12 n.17. The Court approved of calculating the standard deviation
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volves identifying both the skills required for the at-issue jobs73

and the geographical boundaries within which potential applicants reside. 4
Notwithstanding the parameters established in Teamsters and
Hazelwood, the Court in Dothardv. Rawlinson,7 5 reaffirmed the pro-

bative value, in disparate impact litigation, of the type of statistical comparison employed in Griggs.76 In Dothard, the Alabama
Board of Corrections refused to hire a woman for work as a correctional counsellor because she did not meet the statutory minimum weight requirement of one hundred and twenty pounds.77
She instituted a class action charging that this requirement, along
with a minimum height standard of five feet two inches, operated
to discriminate against women in violation of Title VII.78 In an
opinion authored by Justice Stewart, the Court reiterated that a
plaintiff may establish a prima facie Title VII violation by showing that an employer's facially neutral standards selected applicants in a significantly discriminatory pattern. 7' The Court
recognized that the Alabama Board of Corrections' height and
weight requirements, which in combination operated to exclude
approximately forty-one percent of the national female population, but only less than one percent of the national male population, had such a discriminatory effect. 8' The majority stressed
to determine the significance of statistical disparities. Id. at 309 n.14. This calculation in the majority's opinion, reveals "predicted fluctuations from the expected
value of a sample." Id.
73 Id. at 308-10. Specifically, the Court stated that "[w]hen special qualifications
are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather
than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications)
may have little probative value." Id. at 308 n. 13. The Court indicated that in Teamsters a comparison involving the general population rather than the class of truck
drivers was probative, because driving a truck, unlike teaching school, is a skill
readily acquired or commonly possessed by most persons. Id.
74 Id. at 310-12. The Hazelwood Court identified several factors to be considered
by the district court, on remand, to determine whether the relevant labor market
included the City of St. Louis, which had a relatively high number of black teachers
due to special recruiting efforts. Id. These factors included the extent to which St.
Louis City School District teachers desired to work in Hazelwood, and the extent to
which the city district actively diverted teachers from applying to Hazelwood. Id. at
312.
75 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
76 Id. at 329. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1351.
77 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 327.
78 Id. at 328-29. Her claim asserted that the two facially neutral qualification
standards operated to disproportionately exclude women from being employed by
the Alabama Board of Corrections. Id.
79 Id. at 329.
80 Id. at 329-30.
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that comparative statistics concerning actual applicants were not
essential to a finding of discriminatory impact, because that
group of persons would not necessarily represent the potential
applicant pool."' Otherwise qualified individuals, the Court reasoned, might not apply upon realizing their inability to meet the
allegedly discriminatory standards.8 2
After concluding that the plaintiff class had established a
prima facie case of employment discrimination, the DothardCourt
considered whether the defendants had successfully rebutted this
case with evidence that the criteria were job related."' The Court
suggested that the defendant must prove more than mere job re84
latedness to meet this burden in a disparate impact suit.
Although the majority restated the Griggs position that the defendant must show that the challenged selection method was
manifestly related to the employment opportunity in question,"
it also noted that the defendant must demonstrate that the practice is necessary for efficient and safe job performance."6 The
Court held that the employer, by failing to present evidence establishing a correlation between minimum weight and height requirements and job performance, had not met this burden.8 7
The Court's opinion in New York City Transit Authority v.

Beazer,8 ' decided just two years after Dothard, signaled a new reluctance to infer adverse impact on plaintiffs from the theoretical
impact of employment practices on the general population. 9
The Beazer decision also beaconed a new willingness to impose
less rigorous defense standards in disparate impact suits."0 The
plaintiff class in Beazer had sought to prove that the New York
City Transit Authority's refusal to employ methadone users dis81 Id. at 330.
82 Id. The Court

explained that "reliance on general population demographic
data was not misplaced where there was no reason to suppose that physical height
and weight characteristics of Alabama men and women differ markedly from those
of the national population." Id.
83 Id. at 331.
84 Id. at 331-32 n.14. See Furnish, supra note 7, at 427-28.
85 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
86 Id. at 331-32 n.14.
87 Id. at 331. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that merely articulating ajob related reason for use of given selection criteria should be sufficient
to defeat the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. at 339-40 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
88 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
89 Waintroob, supra note 7, at 70. Waintroob stated that the Beazer decision indicated that the Court may require future plaintiffs to demonstrate a challenged practice's effect on the employer's actual applicant pool or work force. Id.
90 See Furnish, supra note 7, at 429-32.
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proportionately excluded black and Hispanic persons. 9 ' The
Court held that the plaintiffs' statistics, which revealed nothing
about the racial composition of potential applicants who use
methadone, or about employees suspected of using methadone
or dismissed for methadone use, had not established a prima facie case of disparate impact. 92 The majority noted further that if
the class had made this showing, the Transit Authority had adequately proven that the requirement was job related.93 Rather
than mentioning the recently articulated stringent job relatedness standard set forth in Dothard,94 the Beazer Court referred to
the language of Griggs and Albemarle, indicating that the defendant
must prove a manifest relationship between the challenged criteria and denied employment opportunity. 95 The majority stated
96
that the Transit Authority's safety goals justified this result.

In 1982, the Supreme Court considered whether an em91 Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584-85 n.25. Four individuals brought a class action on
behalf of those individuals who were or would be discharged from, or refused employment with, the Transit Authority due to participation in methadone maintenance programs. Id. at 576.
92 Id. at 582-87. Evidence that black or Hispanic individuals made up 81% of
the employees referred to the Transit Authority's medical consultant for suspected
drug policy violations revealed nothing about "the racial composition of the employees suspected of using methadone" or about the number of Hispanic, black, or
white persons dismissed for methadone use. Id. at 585 & n.26. Furthermore, evidence that Hispanic or black persons made up 63% of those enrolled in New York
City public methadone maintenance programs provided no information about the
number of individuals in treatment programs who worked for or sought employment with the Transit Authority. Id. at 585. The Court further stated that
[t]his statistic therefore reveals little if anything about the racial composition of the class of [Transit Authority] job applicants and employees receiving methadone treatment. More particularly, it tells us
nothing about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and employees who have participated in methadone maintenance programs for
over a year-the only class improperly excluded by [Transit Authority's] policy ....
The record demonstrates, in fact, that the figure is
virtually irrelevant because a substantial portion of the persons included in it are either unqualified for other reasons-such as the illicit
use of drugs and alcohol--or have received successful assistance in
finding jobs with employers other than [the Transit Authority]. Finally, we have absolutely no data on the 14,000 methadone users in
the private programs, leaving open the possibility that the percentage
of blacks and Hispanics in the class of methadone users is not significantly greater than the percentage of those minorities in the general
population of New York City.
Id. at 585-86 (footnotes omitted).
93 Id. at 587.
94 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
95 Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31.
96 Id.
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ployer was immunized from disparate impact liability by evidence
that the entire selection process resulted in a racially balanced
work force at "bottom line."9 7 The Court rejected this possibility
in Connecticut v. Teal.9" Teal involved a written examination which
disproportionately excluded blacks from further promotion consideration. 99 The test was not shown to be job related.1 0 0 Despite the test, blacks as a group were well-represented among the
persons ultimately promoted by the employer.' 0 ' Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Court, held that the excluded
blacks had suffered discrimination under Title VII.10 2 The Court
reasoned that the test fell within the literal meaning of Title
VII. 3 Justice Powell, writing for the dissent, contended that the
97 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445-51 (1982). In the years following
Griggs, most lower federal courts considered only the overall effect of a selection
process on the minority composition of the employer's work force, or the bottom
line impact on minority persons. See Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination,and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV.
J. ON LEGIs. 99, 102 (1983). This fact, together with the difficulties of validatingjob
selection procedures, prompted employers to adopt voluntary affirmative action
programs. Id. at 102-103; Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95
HARV. L. REV. 945, 954 (1982). Such programs received Supreme Court approval
despite their reliance on race-based selection procedures. Id. at 954-55. See, e.g.,
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
In Weber, the Court upheld a program which reserved 50% of the positions in a
training program for minorities and excluded certain white persons who had more
seniority than some of the blacks selected. Id. at 197, 204. In response to a claim
that the program constituted reverse discrimination, the Court asserted that it
would be ironic if an act passed to help minorities "constituted the first legislative
prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." Id. These programs permitted employers to provide employment opportunities to minorities without abandoning
their selection procedures or undertaking expensive and uncertain validation efforts. See Blumrosen, supra, at 102.
98 457 U.S. at 450.
99 Id. at 443-45. Four black Connecticut state employees were excluded by their
scores on a written examination from further consideration for promotion to permanent supervisory positions. Id. at 442-44. They instituted an action against the
state, agencies, and officials alleging, inter alia, that the defendants "violated Title
VII by imposing, as an absolute condition for consideration for promotion, that
applicants pass a written test that excluded blacks in disproportionate numbers and
that was not job related." Id. at 444. The test passing rate for the identified black
candidates "was approximately 68 percent of the passing rate for the identified
white candidates." Id. at 443. These passing rates "indicated a prima facie case of
adverse impact upon minorities." Id. at 445.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 444.
102 Id. at 451.
103 Id. at 448. The Court further stated that a favorable bottom line neither precludes a prima facie case of disparate impact nor provides a defense to such a suit.
Id. at 442.
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majority blurred the distinction between the disparate treatment
theory, which protects individuals from the effects of intentional
discrimination, and the disparate impact theory, which effectively
protects minority groups from the adverse effect of facially neutral criteria. 0 4 The dissent asserted that the Court had previously considered whether a defendant's total selection process
adversely impacted the protected group. 0 5 Justice Powell speculated that the Court's holding might force employers to choose
between "eliminat[ing] tests or rely[ing] on expensive, job-related, testing procedures, the validity of which may or may not be
sustained if challenged."'° 6
Teal did not discuss whether a plaintiff could use the adverse
effect produced by an entire selection process to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.' °7 Another issue which had
not surfaced in Griggs and its progeny was whether a disparate
impact plaintiff could attack an employer's use of subjective selection criteria. 0 8 Both of these issues were partially addressed
104 Id. at 456-57 (PowellJ., dissenting). TheJustice stated that in disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff attempts to prove direct, intentional discrimination by the
employer against him. Id. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting). In a disparate impact
case, Justice Powell maintained, the plaintiff seeks to create an inference that "as a
member of [a] disproportionately excluded group, [he] was . . . a victim of that
process' 'built-in headwinds.' " Id. at 459 (Powell,J., dissenting) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). The dissent further opined that
"[t]here can be no violation of Title VII ... in the absence of disparate impact on a
group." Id. at 459.
105 Id. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 463 (Powell, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 448-52. The ability to rely on such evidence would appear to be essential to a plaintiff unable to identify specific discriminatory criteria in a muhicomponent selection process. In an opinion subsequent to Teal, Griffin v. Carlin, 744
F.2d 1516 (11 th Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit noted that Teal did not prohibit
disparate impact challenges to entire selection systems. Id. at 1524. The court reasoned that limiting disparate impact analysis to cases in which a single selection
criterion caused adverse impact exempts situations in which the interaction of several components caused adverse impact. Id. at 1525 (citing Gilbert v. City of Little
Rock, Ark., 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984)). See also
SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 3, at § 4.2.1.4 (Teal suggests that disparate impact analysis applies to bottom line of multicomponent employment
systems).
108 Those cases had dealt with "standardized" selection tests or criteria. Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784-85 (1988) (citing Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (written examination); New York Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (rule against employing drug addicts); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (weight and height requirements); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (written verbal skills test); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (written aptitude tests); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971) (written aptitude test and high school diploma)). As a result, lower
courts had disputed the applicability of subjective criteria to the disparate impact
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in the Court's 1987 plurality opinion of Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
and Trust. 10 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Watson to
determine whether subjective selection devices may be evaluated
under the disparate impact model."O The Court unanimously
answered that particular question in the affirmative."' The opinions, however, diverged with respect to articulating the evidentiary standards applicable in such cases."t 2 To prevent employers
from adopting numerical quotas in response to extending disparate impact analysis to subjective employment practices, the Watson plurality explained in detail how evidentiary standards
operate to keep disparate impact analysis within proper
bounds.' 13 To establish a prima facie case, the Watson plurality
stressed, the plaintiff must identify the specific employment practices that allegedly caused any observed statistical disparities." 4
model, see Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1480-81 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1987)
(list of cases), vacated, 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989),
and this topic was the focus of discussion among scholars. See, e.g, Bartholet, supra
note 97 (Griggs standards should apply to subjective systems which select individuals for professional employment); Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VIl's DisparateImpact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 869 (1985) (disparate
impact review of discretionary decisions should accord principled and limited deference to such decisions); Rigler, Title VII and the Applicability of DisparateImpact Analysis to Subjective Selection Criteria, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 25 (1985) (subjective criteria are
amenable to disparate impact review); Rose, supra note 17.
109 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (plurality opinion).
110 Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., concurring).
SI I Id. at 2787. The Court determined that the Griggs analysis would be of little
use to plaintiffs if it was limited to standardized selection practices. Id. at 2786. The
plurality implied that a subjective employment practice involves exercising personal
judgment. Id. at 2785. Because a selection system which combined both subjective
and objective criteria usually must be considered subjective in nature, the Justices
posited, a contrary holding would allow employers to escape a disparate impact
challenge merely by incorporating a subjective component into the selection process along with nondeterminative objective criteria. Id. at 2786.
The Court added that it would be unreasonable to prevent plaintiffs from using the disparate impact theory where unbridled supervisory discretion could cause
the same results as intentional discrimination. Id. The Court reasoned that even if
actual discriminatory intent did not underlie an employer's decision to use subjective criteria, subconscious prejudices and stereotypes could spark an application
resulting in disparate impact. Id.
112 See id. at 2790 (O'ConnorJ, plurality opinion) (defendant need only produce
evidence that legitimate business reasons justify use of controversial employment
practices); id. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (employer must persuade court that employment practice producing statistical disparity is manifestly related to employment in question); id. at 2797 (Stevens
J., concurring in judgment) (inappropriate to address evidentiary standards without
focusing on particular factual context).
113 Id. at 2788.
114 Id. Justice O'Connor declared that the plaintiff is responsible for providing
such evidence especially in situations where an employer uses subjective criteria
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, contended that the
plaintiff must also offer statistical evidence sufficient to demonstrate that each challenged practice had resulted in a denial of
employment opportunities to individuals because they are members of a protected class." 5
The Watson plurality further stated that an employer need
not introduce formal validation studies which reveal that a given
criterion, such as a passing score on an objective test, predicts
actual job performance.I" 6 Justice O'Connor also asserted that
the plaintiff retains the burden of proof at every stage of the litigation. 117 The plurality explained that, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the defendant need
only produce evidence that legitimate business reasons justified
use of the controversial employment practices.' 1 8 The sharply
divided Watson Court conclusively resolved only that the plaintiff,
a black bank employee, could on remand establish a prima facie
violation of Title VII by showing that promotion decisions, left to
the unfettered discretion of supervisors, adversely impacted her
protected class. 1 9 It was against this background that the
120
Supreme Court decided Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.
The Wards Cove majority began its analysis by attacking the
statistical comparisons used to establish the plaintiffs' prima facie
along with more rigid standardized tests or rules. Id. The plurality further observed that the Court's earlier formulations, while not mathematically rigid, had
consistently stressed the need for substantial statistical disparities to raise an inference of causation. Id. at 2789 (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982);
New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.568, 584 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,

401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971)).

115 Id. at 2788-89. Justice O'Connor recognized that the defendant's power to
introduce evidence which discredited the plaintiff's statistical proof protected the
defendant from the potentially harsh effects of expanding disparate impact analysis
to subjective criteria. Id. at 2789-90. The plurality stated that the defendant may
disparage the probative weight of the plaintiff's evidence, impeach its reliability, or
offer rebutting evidence. Id.
116 Id. at 2790. The Court noted the difficulty of validating discretionary employment decisions, and thus, approved of judicial deference in evaluating such decisions, because courts are typically less competent than employers to alter business
practices. Id. at 2791.
117 Id. at 2790.
118 Id. The Court added that it sought to prevent employers from enacting quota
systems contrary to Title VII's nondiscrimination purpose in order to avoid litigation in which the employer would be unable to defend its selection criteria. Id. at

2791.
119 Id. at 2786-87.
120

109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).

850

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:831

case. 12 ' The Court expressed its preference for ascertaining the
percentage of minorities among qualified individuals in the labor
22
market, as compared with persons holding the desired jobs.
Justice White, writing for the majority, asserted that the court of
appeals erred in finding a prima facie case of disparate impact by
comparing the racial composition of the noncannery and cannery
work forces. 2 The Court maintained that such a comparison
was inappropriate because the cannery work force did not reflect
the potential labor force or qualified applicant pool for the jobs

at-issue. 124
The defendant's employment practices, in the Court's view,
were not considered to have resulted in a disparate impact on
minorities where the absence of such persons holding desired
positions was due to an insufficient number of qualified minority
applicants for reasons not attributable to any wrongdoing of the
defendant. 125 The majority set forth that if Title VII required a
racially balanced work force, employers would adopt racial quotas to avoid defending the business necessity of its practices in
time-consuming and expensive litigation. 126 The Court stressed
that Congress expressly rejected this result in drafting Title
27
VII. 1
Justice White also criticized the court of appeals for comparing the racial composition of the cannery work force with the racial composition of the unskilled noncannery work force, even
though the positions in both required somewhat fungible
skills. 128 The Court stated that if the percentage of minority applicants selected for employment was not significantly lower than
the percentage of qualified minority applicants, the employer's
Id. at 2121-24.
Id. at 2121. Relying on the case law set forth in New York Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585 (1979), and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30
(1977), the Court noted that plaintiffs' prima facie cases can rest on comparison
with the racial composition of" 'otherwise-qualified applicants' for at-issue jobs,"
where "labor market statistics [are] difficult [or] impossible to ascertain," or with
" 'figures for the general population [which] accurately reflect the pool of qualified
job applicants .... ' " Id. at 2121 n.6.
123 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-22.
124 Id. at 2122.
125 Id. The majority noted that if evidence suggested that employer practices deterred minorities from applying for at-issue positions, the Court's analysis would be
different. Id. at 2122 n.7 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977)).
126 Id. at 2122.
127 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982)).
128 Id.
121

122
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selection system probably did not cause a disparate impact.,2

9

The majority posited that there was no disparate impact regardless of the percentage of minority workers in other segments of
the employer's work force.' 0 The Court maintained that the
class of cannery workers did not reflect the potential labor force
for the unskilled noncannery positions, because it was both too
narrow and too broad.'' The class was too narrow, the majority
reasoned, because this group excluded all qualified persons who
were not cannery workers.' 3 2 The potential labor market for
noncannery positions, the Court explained, undoubtedly in3
cluded persons who were not employed as cannery workers.'The class was too broad, Justice White continued, because many
of these workers did not seek employment as unskilled noncannery workers, and the evidence did not suggest that the 1employers' practices deterred them from becoming applicants. 31
The Court then reaffirmed the Watson plurality's insistence
that the plaintiff isolate the specific employment practice which
created the adverse impact. 13 5 The majority contended that an
employer who engaged in discriminatory practices cannot avoid
Title VII liability by showing that his bottom line work force was
racially balanced. 3 6 Similarly, a Title VII plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disparate impact merely by exposing a
bottom line racial imbalance in the work force. 137 The Court
posited that a contrary ruling would make employers potentially
liable for countless innocent causes of racial imbalances in their
work forces.'13 The majority opined that liberal discovery rules
giving plaintiffs wide access to employers' records, as well as the
record-keeping requirements of the EEOC Guidelines, ensure
requirement does not unduly burden
that the specific causation
9
3
Title VII plaintiffs.'

Turning to the nature of the employer's defense, the majorId. at 2123.
Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 2124.
136 Id. (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1972)).
137 Id. The Court noted that disparate impact analysis has always considered the
effect of specific employment practices on minorities. Id.
138 Id. at 2125 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777,
2787 (1988)).
139 Id. (citing Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.1 (1988)). The Court explained that the EEOC Guidelines require certain
129
130
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ity articulated that the dispositive issue was whether the challenged practice significantly served the defendant's legitimate
employment goals.' 40 The touchstone of this query, the Court
declared, was "a reasoned review of the employer's justification
for his use of the challenged practice."'' The majority emphasized that the practice need not be essential nor indispensable to
pass muster, as such a level of scrutiny would be extremely difficult to meet. 142 Relying on the authority of the recently decided
Watson plurality opinion, the Court in Wards Cove repeated that
the disparate impact plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion
throughout disparate impact litigation. 143 Thus, the majority determined that the employer carries only the burden of production with respect to the defense ofjob relatedness. 44 The Court
noted that this allocation of proof comports with standard federal
court practice and mirrors the rule applied in disparate treatment
cases. 145 The majority acknowledged that earlier opinions could
be interpreted otherwise, but suggested that this allocation was
required by the statutory language of Title VII.' 46 The Court
noted that the plaintiff who is unable to prove that a particular
selection device is not job related can nevertheless prevail in a
disparate impact suit.' 4 7 The plaintiff can accomplish this, the
majority set forth, by demonstrating that another employment
legitimate business goals
practice would serve the defendant's
48
effect.'
racial
adverse
less
with a
Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmunjoined. 49 Justice Stevens
approved of the majority's decision to remand for additional
findings of fact, but rejected the Court's conclusion that the
employers to maintain records of the effect of practices on the opportunities for
employment of persons by identifiable sex, race, or ethnic groups. Id.
140 Id. at 2125-26.
141 Id. at 2126.
142 Id.
143 Id. (citing Watson, 108 Ct. at 2790).
144 Id. Most lower courts had previously held that the employer assumed the
burden of persuasion on the justification defense. See id. at 2130 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
145 Id. at 2126.
146 Id. The majority observed that "[tihe persuasion burden here must remain
with the plaintiff, for it is he who must prove that it was 'because of such individual's race, color,' etc., that he was denied a desired employment opportunity." Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982)).
147 Id. at 2126-27.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs' statistical comparison did not support a prima facie
case. 150 While the dissent did not dispute the Court's articulation of the appropriate groups for racial comparisons, it questioned the majority's insistence on precision in defining the
relevant labor market.' 5 ' The problem with this approach, Justice Stevens explained, was that it failed to take into account the
special circumstances of the particular case.' 5 2 The dissent maintained that by comparing racial compositions within the defendant's work force, the plaintiffs identified a pool of workers
possessing both a familiarity with the industry and a characteristic undisputedly required for employment in the jobs at-issue,
namely, a willingness to do seasonal work in remote areas of
Alaska. 1 53 Justice Stevens contended that using this labor market
for statistical comparisons would be more probative than using
the defendants' "untailored" general population, which had ambiguously defined parameters.' 54 The dissent acknowledged that
while evidence of racial stratification in the employer's work force
may not alone establish a prima facie case, it comprises a "significant element" when considered along with
other obvious barri155
minorities.
for
opportunities
job
to
ers

Justice Stevens further disapproved of the majority's requirement that the plaintiff identify the specific selection devices
which allegedly caused any statistical disparities. 156 While admitting that the "causal link must have substance," the Justice argued that the act need not be the primary or sole cause of the
harm. 157 The dissent claimed that proof of numerous questionaclaim that the deble practices ought to strengthen the plaintiffs'
15
disparities.
racial
caused
fendants' practices
Relying on the principles set forth in Griggs, Justice Stevens
150

Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

151

Id.

152

Id.

Id. at 2134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2134-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun in a short separate
dissenting opinion argued that the industry structure rendered all other statistical
comparisons meaningless. Id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 2135-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such barriers, the dissent contended,
were the practices of recruiting employees for noncannery jobs from outside the
defendants' work force, disseminating information about the availability of at-issue
jobs by word of mouth, conducting nepotistic hiring, and maintaining housing and
boarding facilities which separated cannery from noncannery workers. Id. at 2135
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153

154
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rejected the majority's characterization of the defendant's burden in disparate impact cases.' 59 Arguing that Title VII is directed to the consequences of hiring practices rather than the
motivation, the dissent asserted that a facially neutral practice
which operates to disqualify minorities is lawful only if it advances a valid business purpose, or, put another way, has a "man60
ifest relationship" to the denied employment opportunity.
" 'The touchstone,' " the dissent declared, "is business
6

necessity."'1 '

Justice Stevens asserted that the Supreme Court had earlier
recognized Congress' intention to place the burden of proof with
respect to the job relatedness defense on the employer.' 6 2 The
dissent observed that this result is consistent with the order of
proof in ordinary civil trials in which the defendant assumes the
burden of proof of an affirmative defense once the plaintiff demonstrates harm. 6 3 In a disparate impact case, Justice Stevens
noted, the harm-adverse disproportionate impact of selection
criteria on a particular minority group-is proven by the plaintiff's statistical evidence. 164 The dissent explained that, in contrast, the disparate treatment plaintiff appropriately retains the
burden of proof at all times. 165 The reason for this, Justice Stevens posited, is that the harm-intentional
discrimination-is at
166
issue throughout the litigation.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun faulted
the Court for altering the order of proof, prohibiting the use of
racial stratification evidence, and requiring rigid statistical proof
of causation. 167 Anticipating harsh consequences resulting from
the majority's decision, Justice Blackmun expressed doubt that
of society's longstanding
the majority appreciated the severity
168
problem with race discrimination.
To one unfamiliar with the development of disparate impact
jurisprudence, the Wards Cove majority's articulation of eviden159 Id. at 2128-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
162 Id. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
163 Id. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall also
joined this dissenting opinion. Id.
168 Id.
160
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tiary standards and burdens of proof would appear uneventful.
The plaintiff's ability to identify at least one act of the defendant
which caused harm assumes a central role in the ordinary civil
trial. 169 When injury is defined as unjustifiably using selection
methods that adversely affect a protected group, then one would
expect the plaintiff to carry the burden of proving both that the
employer utilized such practices and was unjustified in doing
so.'

70

Despite the logical appeal of imposing this traditional liti-

gation structure on disparate impact cases, such an approach
contravenes longstanding Title VII precedent and drastically
reduces the effectiveness of the disparate impact
theory as a
7'
discrimination.'
employment
against
weapon
One new roadblock to a successful disparate impact suit is
the majority's requirement that any statistical comparison used to
establish a prima facie case reflect, as closely as possible, the adverse effect of a specific employment practice on particular minority persons who sought an opportunity or would have
pursued one but for the employer's challenged practice. 172 In
rigidly adhering to this rule, the Court refuses to permit reasonable inferences from somewhat imprecise statistical comparisons,
which are often the best available due to factors such as the nature of the industry or questionable employment practices. One
such practice may be the employer's failure to keep adequate
records of the racial effect of the selection system. Another practice may be the employer's drawing of geographical boundaries
that circumvent obvious potential labor pools, and thus reduce
the probative value of applicant statistics. Despite evidence that
such circumstances in Wards Cove forced the plaintiffs to provide,
in the majority's view, substandard racial comparisons, the Court
summarily disregarded those statistics. 73 In discounting eviSee, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
See, e.g., id. at §§ 328 A, 433 B.
171 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissinting); id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Penda Hair of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund stated that the Wards Cove decision "does not make
it impossible to prove [disparate impact] cases, but makes it more difficult. The
important point about Griggs was that once you carried the prima facie case, the
burden shifted and it was a tremendous litigation advantage." Stewart, Civil Rights:
Just a Trim?, 75 A.B.A. J. 40, 44 (Aug. 1989).
172 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-24.
173 Id. Justice Stevens noted that the companies in Wards Cove kept no statistical
personnel records. Id. at 2133 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While the dissent did
not suggest that the employers were at fault for their failure to do so, it recognized
the difficulty this failure imposed on the plaintiffs. Id.
Justice Stevens cited as one questionable employment practice the companies'
169
170
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dence of a racial disparity between two groups of workers and
requiring data on actual applicants for the preferred positions,
the Court ignored the likelihood that discriminatory practicesnot an indifference to preferred jobs or an inability to perform
certain tasks-effectively barred nonwhites from applying for
those positions. 74
Another disquieting aspect of the Wards Cove opinion is the
majority's requirement that the plaintiff identify the specific dis1 75
criminatory components responsible for a racial disparity.
Lower courts, recognizing that complex multicomponent selection systems could prevent such identification, had permitted
plaintiffs to base their prima facie cases on bottom line racial disparities.171 The Wards Cove decision implicitly prohibits such bottom line challenges. 177 On the surface, the plaintiff's burden
custom of recruiting employees for desirable positions from "outside the work
force rather than from lower-paying, overwhelmingly nonwhite, cannery worker positions." Id. at 2135 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent further
observed:
Information about availability of at-issue positions [was] conducted by
word of mouth; therefore, the maintenance of housing and mess halls
that separate[d] the largely white noncannery work force form the
cannery workers, coupled with the tendency toward nepotistic hiring,
[were] obvious barriers to employment opportunities for nonwhites .... [Ilt would be quite wrong to conclude that these practices
have no discriminatory consequence.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
174 Id. at 2123. The majority failed to notice, as the Dothard Court had, that
"[t]he application process itself might not adequately reflect the actual potential
applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards challenged as
being discriminatory." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
175 Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2124-25.
176 See, e.g., Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11 th Cir. 1985); Gilbert v. City
of Little Rock, Ark., 722 F.2d 1390, 1396-98 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
972 (1984).
177 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124-25. Professor Cox noted that the Watson plurality, in imposing such a requirement, seemed to preclude attacks on bottom line
results of multicomponent selection processes. Cox, supra note 3, at 781. He further asserted that the plurality decision's effect on subjective employment practices
remained uncertain. Id. He observed:
[A]n attack on a subjective judgment itself founded upon multiple
considerations of relative advantage or disadvantage may not be precluded. Thejudgment, once identified, is a subjective criterion. Less
clear is whether the plurality would permit impact theory attacks on
standardless delegation of hiring or promotion authority. Arguably,
the act of delegation, or the failure to provide a standard for the exercise of delegated authority, are specific criteria that may be
challenged.
Id. Another scholar noted that courts were unlikely to require that plaintiffs identify selection practices not defined by the employer and they would simply identify
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appears no more foreboding than the employer's inability, as required by Teal, to defend a Title VII suit with evidence of a racially balanced bottom line.178 It is nonetheless inconsistent with
the Teal Court's seeming determination to expand the Title VII
protection afforded to plaintiffs. 179 Furthermore, the majority's
requirement permits the adoption of complex systems, such as
the one at issue in Wards Cove, that cause racial disparities and
require no justification. 180 The majority's approach reveals the
Court's insensitivity to the importance of battling discrimination
with respect to selection of professional employees where complex, discretionary selection systems are most likely to be
found.'18

Perhaps the most startling barrier to a successful disparate
impact suit is the employer's limited burden of justifying a challenged criterion.' 82 While the Court in New York Transit Authority
v. Beazer had already indicated that precise statistical correlations
between the challenged criteria and success in the at-issue jobs
the employment practice believed to have caused their adverse treatment. Mertens,
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust: UnansweredQuestions, 14 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
L.J. 163, 171 (1988).
178 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1982). The Wards Cove Court, in
effect, adopted a mutuality argument. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124-25. As explained by one commentator, "the mutuality argument is that if an employer cannot use system statistics to defend against a challenge to an element of that system,
then plaintiffs should not be permitted to use system statistics to attack an element
or elements of that system." Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination:
Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 830 (1985).
179 Teal, 457 U.S. at 448-49. Commentators observed:
[S]traightforward application of Teal would lead to the conclusion that
disparate impact analysis does apply to the bottom line of a multicomponent employment system. By showing that blacks are underrepresented in upper level jobs, and overrepresented in lower level
jobs, plaintiff would appear to be demonstrating the existence of a
barrier to the employment opportunities of blacks. That barrier is the
cumulative result of the employer's recruiting, hiring, and promotion
practices that blocked blacks from equal access to higher level jobs.
After Teal, the Griggs language concerning employer practices and
policies is less important than the showing of barriers to employment
opportunities of women and minority males.
SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 3, at § 4.2.1.4, at 158.
180 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
181 See Bartholet, supra note 97, at 998-99. Bartholet has noted, however, that
regardless of who assumes the burden, the notion of identifying a specific practice
is not insurmountable, even in the multicomponent environment, as long as courts
employ sophisticated statistical methods and computer technology to determine
factors that played a key role in complex, subjective decision making systems. Id. at
999-1000.
182 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
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were unnecessary,'" 3 the Court had never before suggested that
the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on this issue.l84 Because proving, or disproving, the validity of an employer's practice is a difficult and expensive task, placement of that burden on
the plaintiff will undoubtedly cause many disparate impact plaintiffs to lose, settle, or decline to bring a suit. 8 5 In the few cases
that survive these preliminary obstacles, plaintiffs will likely need
to prove that alternative practices would support the employer's
8 6
legitimate goals with a less racially undesirable effect.1
The Wards Cove Court's rationale for its newly articulated evidentiary standards-that they will guard against the compelled7
adoption of affirmative action programs-is unpersuasive.1
The Teal Court had previously indicated that employers are not
immunized from Title VII liability by enacting such plans. '88 The
Wards Cove majority, apparently recognizing that the Teal decision
had offered employers unsatisfactory alternatives, 8 9 ironically
extended Teal's logic to impose an equally weighty burden on
disparate impact plaintiffs. The Court's aversion to affirmative
action programs reflects its misunderstanding of the Civil Rights
Act's purpose "to enhance the status of minorities as groups in
183 New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); supra notes
93-96 and accompanying text.
184 Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 See Kandel, supra note 52, at 264. Because the defendant adopted and maintained the challenged practice, one scholar noted, the defendant is better situated
to prove, rather than merely articulate, a legitimate business purpose. Smith, Employer Defenses in Employment DiscriminationLitigation: A Reassessment of Burdens of Proof
and Substantive Standards Following Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372, 395 (1982). Requiring the plaintiff to assume the burden
of persuasion with respect to this defense, Smith argued, drastically undercuts his
or her ability to prevail. Id.
186 The employer can undoubtedly produce some common sense justification for
selection practices. Bartholet, supra note 97, at 957. Consequently, only a plaintiff
who can prove the existence of less discriminatory alternatives will prevail. Wards
Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
187 Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2122.
188 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445-51 (1982).
189 Professor Blumrosen observed that:
Teal forces the employer to select from among alternatives that are
not satisfactory from the perspective of either equal employment opportunity or sound business management. Employers may drop formal selection devices in favor of more subjective procedures. They
may divert resources that could otherwise go into training or recruiting into expensive and uncertain validation efforts. Finally, employers
may decide that further affirmative action programs are no longer
worth the effort since they will not protect employers from direct discrimination suits.
Blumrosen, supra note 97, at 103.
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American society."' 90 Indeed, at least one scholar predicted that
Teal, in refusing to protect employers that enacted such programs, would stunt efforts to combat employment discrimination. 9' In a similar manner, by virtually shielding employers
from Title VII liability, the Wards Cove decision reduces the employer's incentive to actively fight employment discrimination
and guarantees that it will continue to pervade our society for
many years to come.
Emilie M. Meyer
190 Id.

191 See id. See also Bartholet, supra note 97, at 957-58 (discussing importance of
affirmative action alternative to validation of selection procedures used in professional work forces).

